Recently, a client of my law firm was charged in a criminal complaint with simple assault in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a(1) & other disorderly persons offenses. Pursuant to said statute, a person commits an offense of simple assault if they attempt to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. The client’s wife, on the basis of the simple assault & other disorderly persons charges, made application for a final restraining order (FRO). The standard for proving the assault allegations in the complaint at the FRO hearing was by a preponderance of the evidence. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29.
The issue of whether my client assaulted his wife was successfully adjudicated at the Superior Court level at the FRO hearing before a family court judge. Again, the standard, again, for proving the allegations in the FRO complaint shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-25. The family court judge conducted a plenary hearing and heard testimony from both my client and his wife. The court then denied his wife’s application for an FRO and ruled that she did not prove simple assault or the other offenses set forth in the FRO complaint by a preponderance of the evidence. The standard of proof in the domestic violence context is much lower than what is required in the criminal context, as the prosecution is compelled by the New Jersey and Federal Constitutions to bear the burden of proving each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. N.J.S.A. 2C: 1-13, State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523, 530 (2001), and Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 229 (2001) (emphasis added).
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required for all crimes, disorderly persons offenses, and petty disorderly persons offenses. State v. J.T., 294 N.J. Super. 540, 545 – 546 (App. Div. 1996). The wife, despite being represented by a lawyer, was unable to sustain the lesser burden at the Superior Court level as there were no witnesses, photographs of visible injuries, medical records, or quite frankly, anything to substantiate her absurd allegations. In fact, cell phone communication proved that the wife apologized for her own actions & pleaded with the husband to come back home after he fled from the couple’s home.
When the criminal charge of simple assault, in addition to the other disorderly persons offenses, were subsequently scheduled in the municipal court, we obtained the transcript from the FRO hearing and argued that the State could not sustain the higher burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the criminal allegations alleged.
Specifically, we first argued that the allegations set forth in the criminal complaint were already litigated at the Superior Court level and, therefore, the principle of res judicata applied. Res judicata is the preclusionary principle that bars the relitigation of already settled issues. The prerequisite condition for the applicability of this doctrine is that the second litigation involves the same parties and the same claims. Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 587 – 88 (1975). The doctrine of res judicata contemplates that when a controversy between parties is once fairly litigated and determined it is no longer open to relitigation. Lubliner v. Board of ABC, 33 N.J. 428, 35 (1960). In the instant matter, not only had the same parties already litigated the same issue before a court of competent jurisdiction, but the standard of proof in the previous litigation was less than the burden required in the second proceeding now before the municipal court. Hence, Res judicata should have precluded the second litigation of the same issue between the same parties, i.e., the husband and wife.
We additionally argued that stare decisis is a principle of adherence, for the sake of certainty and stability, to precedents once established. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 361 (1960). The doctrine has at its core the need for predictability in cases. J&M Land v. First Union Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 521 (2001). We respectfully argued in our brief that the municipal court judge should follow the earlier decision of the family court judge under the doctrine of stare decisis.
CONCLUSION
While the municipal court judge did not decide the firm’s motion to dismiss as counsel for the client’s estranged wife agreed to dismiss the simple assault and other assorted charges on the trial date, my learned adversary apparently agreed with the arguments we had advanced in our brief on the husband’s behalf. Finally, here, my firm was in proper receipt of the transcript and a defendant is typically permitted to use a plaintiff’s testimony in the domestic violence matter for cross-examination of plaintiff during testimony in the criminal case. For these reasons, it is essential for a defendant to have excellent, experienced counsel for both proceedings.